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carpenters have used for various purposes. When it is employed to
describe only the intending of the act and not the intending of the
resulting injury, there is good authority for labeling the product "acci-
dental injury." EUGENE STEEL
LANDLORD AND TENANT
REDUCTION OF RENT - CONSIDERATION -A BATEMENT
AFTER FIRE
The plaintiff lessee entered into a written lease with defendant lessor
for a term of 2o years from August, 1928. The lease reserved an
annual rental of $io,ooo a year, payable in nine monthly installments
starting on August 15 of each year. Plaintiff alleged that on November
16, 1934, the lease was modified in writing by the parties so that the
rent reserved was reduced to the sum of $7,200 for the year beginning
August 15, 1934. In May of 1935 a fire destroyed the premises. In
November, 1935, the defendant lessor, having become bankrupt, listed
a claim against plaintiff lessee for rent remaining unpaid at the time of
the fire on the basis of the rent of $io,ooo originally reserved in the
lease. Plaintiff lessee set out the written agreement of November, 1934,
reducing the rent to $7,2oo. Defendant lessor pleaded lack of consid-
eration for the rent reduction. Judgment for the plaintiff lessee was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This court held that the inability of
the lessee to pay the higher rent, his imminent insolvency, and the desire
of the landlord to retain the lessee as a tenant, constituted a valid con-
sideration for the reduction in rent, and the lessor could not repudiate
the contract. Adams Recreation Palace, Inc. v. Griffith, Trustee, 58
Ohio App. 216, 12 0. Op. 134, 16 N.E. (2d) 489 (1938).
In contract law the rule that payment of part of a debt is not satis-
faction of the whole has long been considered elementary.' But like
many harsh rules of law, this rule has been so amended by exceptions,
both by statute and judicial decision, as to partially or wholly nullify its
effect. So any consideration, however small and insignificant, has been
held to satisfy the rule. Thus a subsequent agreement to pay part of a
debt in satisfaction of the whole is supported by sufficient consideration
if the debtor becomes bound to do anything he was not legally bound
to do by the first agreement. Payment at a different time, in a different
place, or in another manner other than was contemplated in the original
agreement have all been held to constitute sufficient consideration to
1 WILLIETON, CONTRACT:, sec. 120.
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support an agreement to accept payment of a part of a debt in complete
discharge of it. Also payment by a third person has been held to be
sufficient consideration. Several states have changed the rule by statute.'
Others have reached the same result by judicial decision.3
In the cases involving a reduction of rent from that reserved in the
lease the courts have reaffirmed this general rule of consideration.4 But
here again, while the courts purport to require consideration for the rent
reduction, they strive to relax the strictness of the rule. The cases, while
numerous, show the recent origin of the problem. It was not until after
185o that the problem became serious in England, and there is almost
a total absence of cases in the United States before that date. In an early
Irish case5 it was said that it would be inequitable to decree the payment
of the larger rent after the acceptance of the smaller sum for twenty
years. In an Irish case6 the court held such an agreement invalid for
want of consideration, the promise being merely voluntary. This case
has since been overruled.'
In the United States the history of the cases has been similar. The
earlier cases allowed the lessor to recover the rent originally reserved in
the lease.' But since 189o the courts have almost uniformly found
consideration for the agreement to reduce the rent, on widely divergent
grounds. The earlier view was that the subsequent agreement operated
as a surrender of the lease.9 This view was also held in England and
Ireland, but has been repudiated.'" The courts who find a surrender
do not explain what has taken the place of the old lease, and since the
parties intend to continue bound by it, this argument does not seem to
be either logical, or a desirable one to follow. Another view held by a
few courts is that payment and acceptance of the reduced rent, with a
receipt given, is evidence of a gift of the balance." These courts ignore
the fact that there has been no delivery, and the theory would seem to
fail on that ground.
2 Alabama, California, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Georgia, Maine, North
Carolina, Tennessee (receipt good consideration), Virginia (part payment when accepted
as payment in full extinguishes the debt).
* Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Pennsylvania.
Liebreich v. Tyler State Bank, ioo S.W. (zd) 15z (Texas Civil Appeals 1936). See
I TIFFANY, LANDLORD & TENANT IO58 and cases cited.
, Clark v. Moore, a Jo. and Lat. 723 (184).
' Fitzgerald v. Partarlington, I Jones 431 (835).
See Berry v. Berry [19z9] z K.B. 316.
543 A.L.R. 1478.
.Hyman. v. Jockey Club, 9 Colo. App. 299, 48 Pac. 671 (1897); Nachbour v.
Weiner, 34 Ill. App. Z37 (1889); Bowman v. Wright, 65 Neb. 66x, 91 N.W. 580 (1902);
Copper v. Fretoransky, 16 N. Y. Supp. 866, 4z N.Y. 47z (892). This theory has been
repudiated in California and New York.
"o Crowley v. Vitty, 7 Exch. 39 (x85z); Re Smith and Hartogs, ex parte Official
Receiver, 73 L. T. Rep. zzi (i895).
"McKenzie v. Harrison, Z2o N.Y. z6o, 24 N.E. 458 (189o); Doyle v. Dunne,
x44 Ill. App. 14 (1908). Contra, Riley v. Kershaw, 5Z Mo. 224 (1873).
116
NOTES AND COMMENTS 117
The approach most generally followed is the one the Ohio court
followed in the principal case,' 2 that the imminent insolvency of the
lessee and his continued possession are sufficient consideration for the
agreement to reduce the rent. 3 It is significant to note that almost
invariably this problem has arisen about the time of some major economic
depression, in periods of declining rental values. The cases fall into
several fairly distinct periods: I89o-19o5; 1920-1925; 1930 to the
present time. Judges have been repeatedly faced with cases involving
lessees who could no longer pay the larger rent of more prosperous
years. This has resulted in an attempt to find some means of relaxing
the strict rule of consideration to relieve these lessees of their burde, In
the leading case of Ten Eyck v. Sleeper'4 the court said that mere
inability of the lessee to pay is not sufficient consideration, but the lessee's
continued occupancy, coupled with the fact that the depression of 1893
had caused property values to fall so that the property would be hard to
rent, was consideration for the agreement to reduce the rent.'" In
Hyman v. Jockey Club, supra, the court said that the continuing tenancy
of the lessee was sufficient consideration.' 6 Thus it seems that the
reasoning of the court is based on a theory of social expediency made
necessary by the hardships of the time. This is aptly illustrated by a
quotation from 43 A.L.R. 1451 at page 1466," "If, in the course of
performing a contract, unexpected obstacles are encountered, or new
conditions arise that the parties could neither have contemplated nor
reasonably foreseen, making the performance more onerous or less
advantageous than was anticipated, and requiring, equitably, at least, a
readjustment of the contractual relations, a subsequent agreement of the
parties, providing that he who is called upon to meet the new difficulties
or obligations shall be correspondingly compensated by an increase of
remuneration, or a decrease of outlay, is to be deemed supported by a
sufficient consideration." The courts took judicial notice of the depres-
sion of 1933, and held that the detriment to the lessee was sufficient
consideration. It is clear from the opinions that the courts feel that the
",-Adams Recreation Palace v. Griffiths, 58 Ohio App. z16, 16 N.E. zd 4 89 (x93S).
"3 Ten Eyck v. Sleeper, 65 Minn. 413, 67 N.W. 1o26 (1896); Hyman v. Jockey
Club, op. cit.; Andre v. Gracbncr, iz6 Mich. 116, 85 N.-W. 464 (igoi)i Lindeke Land
Co. v Kalman, 19o Minn. 6os, zgz N.W. 65o (1934)i Liebreic v. Tyler State Bank,
100 S.W. (2d) z5z (Tex. Civil App. 1936).
t, 65 Minn. 413, 67 NAy. xoz6 (I896).
t Alfirmed, Lindeke Land Co. v. Kalman, 19 o Minn. 6oi, z52 N.W. 65o (1934)-
o See WOOD, LANDLORD AND TENANT 44; TAYLOR, LANDLORD AND TENANT, secs. 497-
sOI.
"7 Quoted by the court in Liebreick v. Taylor State Bank, ioo S.W. (2d) XSz (Tex.
Civil App. 5936).
" Note 17, supra.
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acceptance of the reduced rent may be more advantageous to the land-
lord than the use of his legal remedies against a defaulting tenant."
More clearly illustrative of the eagerness of the courts to find con-
sideration for the subsequent agreement are the decisions upholding the
validity of oral agreements to reduce the rent. Where the agreement is
oral, however, the courts draw a sharp distinction between executed and
executory agreements. In general it may be said that an executed oral
agreement to reduce the rent is valid, and not within the Statute of
Frauds, while an unexecuted oral agreement will not be enforced because
of the Statute of Frauds. In Ohio the statute provides that all leases be
in writing.2" In the case of Nonamaker v. A4mos, 2 ' it was held that
where royalties of oil were to be paid to the lessor in lieu of rent, the
amount of oil so paid could be varied at the will of the parties by oral
agreement. Ohio Jurisprudence states that an agreement to reduce the
rent under an existing lease does not involve the title to land or an
interest therein, and does not have to be in writing.2 Professor Williston
is of the opinion that to hold an oral agreement valid would be incon-
sistent with the established rule of consideration, but he does not analyze
the cases. 3 A recent New York statute expressly dispenses with the
need for consideration in modifying agreements.24
Payment and acceptance with a receipt in full has been held to be
a gift of the balance.2" Oral agreements have been held binding irre-
spective of a written receipt (a) on the ground that the continuing
tenancy of the lessee was pro tanto consideration for the agreement;2
(b) on the ground that the general rule must not be applied to a case
where the parties to a contract, still executory, agree to reduce the
consideration and thereafter both sides execute it as modified;"7 (c) on
the ground that the payment was by check; 2" (d) on the ground that
upon the failure of the tenant to pay rent according to the lease, the
19 So Harv. L. Rev. 1314. See 43 A.L.R. 1478 and 93 A.L.R. 14o6, where the cases
are collected and discussed. A promise by the lessee to renew the lease held to be sufficient
consideration. Huff v. Leeds, i6 Ohio App. 342 (s9zz).
'0 Ohio General Code, sec. 86o.
-1 73 Ohio St. x63, 76 N.E. 949 (igoS).
_ 24+ Ohio Jur. Landlord & Tenant, sec. 332, embodied from zS R.C.L. 564.
25 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, sec. 520, page 258. But see Williston, "Law of Con-
tracts Since the Restatement," 23 A.B.A.j. 172, 175 (1937).
2' New York Personal Property Laws, sec. 33.
"McKenzie v. Harrison, i2o N.Y. z6o, 24 N.E. 458 (i8go); Doyle v. Dunne,
144 Ill. App. 24 (29o8).
-
8 Hyman v. Jockey Club, 9 Colo. App. 299, 48 Pac. 672 (1897); Andre v. Graebner,
sz6 Mich. xx6, 85 N.W. 464 (19os).
" Brackett Co. v. Lofgren, 140 Minn. 52, x67 N.W. 274 L.R.A. (N.S.) 191SF
998 (xxs8), Bowman v. Wright, 65 Neb. 66s, 92 N.W. 58o (x9oz).
"' Ossowski v. Wiesner, 101 Wis. 238, 77 N.W. 184 (1898); Eisenberg v. Batten-
field Oil Co., zs Mich. 654, 23z N.W. 386 (1930).
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landlord had only the option of suing on the contract or treating it as
abrogated and entering into an entirely new contract;' 9 (e) on the
ground that such an executed agreement is a waiver of the balance of
the rent, a voluntary relinquishment of a known right, for which con-
sideration is not necessary."0 In California a statute provides for a
waiver of the balance."
From these cases then, it may be said that written agreements, and
executed oral agreements, to reduce rent from that originally reserved,
must be supported by consideration, but that the courts will find consid-
eration in almost any benefit to the lessor, or detriment to the lessee. It
is significant that almost without exception, every case since 1900 involv-
ing the two foregoing classes of cases has been held valid and binding
upon the lessor.
In the principal case the court held that where the lease provides
that in the event the property is rendered unfit for occupancy because of
fire the rent for the remainder of the term should abate, and if a fire
occurs at the end of the ninth month of the rent-year, the rent for the
succeeding three months is abated, and the lessor may not recover the
rent for the last three months, either on the theory that the entire annual
rental should have been paid in the first nine installments, or on the
theory that the lessor may so apply the payments made that the rent for
the first three months of the annual term shall remain unpaid, and the
irregular installments of rent applied to the rent for the last three months.
On the second of the two theories the lessor relied on the case of Felix
v. Griffiths, 56 Ohio St. 39, 45 N.E. 1092 (897), which held that
rent paid in advance cannot be recovered under the fire clause in this
lease. J. ERNEST STILWELL
NEGLIGENCE
LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS AND VENDORS
Ascertaining the liability of a manufacturer or vendor to those not
in privity of contract with them has presented the courts with a diflicult
problem. In the recent Ohio case of Sicard v. Kremer, 133 Ohio St.
291, 13 N.E. (2d) 250, io Ohio Op. 367 (1938), the plaintiff, who
owned a beauty-shop, purchased hair dye from a retailer to whom the
' Conlan v. Spokane Hardware Co., 117 Wash. 378, 201 Pac. 26 (1921).
Hurlbut v. Buttc-Kansas Co., 12o Kan. 20, 243 Pac. 324 (1926).
21 California Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 2o76, provides that objection to the
amount of a tender must be made at the time the tender is made, or the person to whom
the tender is made is deemed to have waived the balance. Applied in Julian v. Gold,
214 Cal. 74, 3 Pac. (2d) 1009 (193).
